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Elite and Leadership Change in Liberal Democracies 
[2007] 
John Higley & Jan Pakulski  
Abstract: »Elitenwandel und Führungswechsel in liberalen Demokratien«. 
This article presents and assesses the thesis that a shift in the character of go-
verning elites and leaders has been occurring in several important liberal de-
mocracies during recent years. Ascendant elites are more leonine and top lead-
ers are more pugnacious. We attribute the shift to strong centripetal pressures 
that now impinge on elites and leaders, and we ask about the shift’s conse-
quences for the operation of liberal democracies. 
Keywords: elites, leaders, liberal democracies, Pareto, Weber. 
 
Starting with the ascendancies of Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan, and 
Helmut Kohl in the 1980s, there has been a perceptible shift in the character 
and style of political leadership in liberal democracies. This is the rise of lead-
ers less inclined to engage in a politics of compromise and consensus and more 
disposed toward peremptory actions backed by force or its threat. These leaders 
gain executive office through steadily more plebiscitary electoral contests in 
which their ostensibly superior instincts are glorified and their competitors’ 
alleged defects are savaged. In office, they concentrate government power in 
core executives at the expense of legislatures and bureaucracies, and they wield 
power with greater impunity than predecessors. The shift is not uniform across 
all liberal democracies, and in the countries where it is most noticeable it has 
not been linear – there are ebbs and flows. But a trend toward more determined 
and resolute leaders – or, at least, leaders widely perceived as such – is evident: 
George W. Bush and Tony Blair; Junichiro Koizumi and Silvio Berlusconi; 
Australia’s John Howard and Denmark’s Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Jose Zapa-
tero in Spain, Stephen Harper in Canada, and Angela Merkel in Germany may 
prove to be further instances, while the aspirations of forceful individuals to 
national leadership elsewhere should not be ignored – Nicolas Sarkozy and 
Jean-Marie Le Pen in France, Carl I. Hagen in Norway, for a time Jorg Haider 
in Austria, Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands before his assassination. Although 
the label may be overly dramatic, “caesarist” leaders who gain power by ple-
biscitary means form a trend somewhat reminiscent of European politics during 
the interwar decades (cf. Linz 1978; Linz and Stepan 1978; Lukacs 2005; Pax-
ton 2004). 
                                                             
  Reprint of: Higley, John, and Jan Pakulski. 2007. Elite and Leadership Change in Liberal 
Democracies. Comparative Sociology 6 (1/2): 6-26. 
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This apparent shift in the character and style of political leaders is not the 
full story. In complex liberal democracies leaders are embedded in, and their 
effectiveness significantly depends upon, political elites; tiny groups of strateg-
ic position-holders with the organized capacity to affect political outcomes 
regularly and substantially (Higley and Burton 2006: 5-8). Leaders with force-
ful images are in important degree creations of elites – horses they ride to pow-
er. The image of Ronald Reagan as a decisive leader was initially the handi-
work of a public relations firm in California, and from start to finish his 
presidential leadership was carefully choreographed and staged by power-
holders who knew much more about politics and issues of the day than Reagan 
ever bothered to learn (Cannon 1982). This is transparently the case with the 
unworldly George W. Bush, who, possessing a household name, has been the 
puppet of a neo-conservative elite that plucked him from the politically inno-
cuous Texas governorship in order to bull itself into executive power (Lind 
2003). In some situations a leader’s aura of strength may stem primarily from 
disarray among an opposing elite. Margaret Thatcher, who never won a majori-
ty of votes, owed much of her leadership image to chaos in the Labour Party 
elite, just as Tony Blair’s image has owed not a little to the Tory elite’s wan-
derings in the political wilderness. 
The ways in which leaders and elites affect each other is, of course, a knotty 
problem in political analysis. Few would deny that their relations are reciproc-
al: leaders galvanize and orient elites, but without the power and influence that 
elites possess leaders can accomplish little. It is also obvious that relations 
between leaders and elites display much variation. Like Reagan and Bush, 
some leaders appear to be not much more than front men for well-formed elite 
groups. But like Tony Blair and John Howard, other leaders impose their wills 
on the elites they head. Everywhere, leaders act within the norms and structures 
of elite politics, some of which allow leaders wide latitude while others tightly 
constrain them. At present in the US, for example, a considerable part of the 
political elite is threatening to punish George W. Bush and his White House 
mandarins and cabinet secretaries for breaching norms about the scope of pres-
idential power and the degree to which it can be exercised unilaterally. Beyond 
loose or tight norms, leaders must contend with elite structures that may be 
quite concentrated or fragmented. A fair amount of research shows that in 
liberal democracies elite structures consist of extended circles and networks of 
political influence and personal acquaintance that tie together several thousand 
of the uppermost figures in politics, government administration, business, trade 
unions, the media, a bevy of interest groups, and so on. Such complex and far-
flung elite webworks usually stifle the single-minded pursuit of a leader’s 
political aims. 
These considerations suggest that if a shift toward more forceful leaders is 
occurring in at least some liberal democracies then a comparable shift in elites 
must also be occurring. We intend to explore the thesis that this is a time of 
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increasingly forceful leaders embedded in more aggressive, tightly organized, 
and mutually antagonistic elites in at least some liberal democracies. We con-
duct this exploration from the standpoints of Vilfredo Pareto and Max Weber. 
Specifically, we combine Pareto’s discussion of how fox-like elites governing 
‘demagogic plutocracies’ give way to leonine elites and more forceful rule 
(1935: 2178, 2190, 2221-2229, 2231-2236, 2257, 2480) with Weber’s discus-
sion of how “leader democracy” (Führerdemokratie) needs charismatic leaders 
to be sustainable (1978: 1121-1127, 1458-1460). Given the philosophical dif-
ferences between Pareto and Weber, combining their insights may seem prob-
lematic, although it has been argued that the two theorists, who were contem-
poraries, engaged in an “unacknowledged dialogue” (Sica 1988: 225-249). 
Both viewed politics from an elite and leadership perspective; they observed 
and diagnosed the same political trends in Europe (and to a lesser extent the 
US) during the stormy early years of the twentieth century; they held unsenti-
mental views of democracy and regarded effective elites (Pareto) and charis-
matic leaders (Weber) as crucial for its workings. In spite of different philo-
sophical underpinnings – Pareto’s positivism and Weber’s neo-Kantianism – 
their political analyses were complementary. Pareto saw individual leaders as 
displaying all manner of foibles and stupidities, so he thought it more profitable 
to concentrate on the overall psycho-social physiognomies and dispositions of 
elites. Weber, as his concept of leader democracy implies, regarded charismatic 
and statesmen-like leaders as vital, and he paid little attention to the characte-
ristics of elites as wholes. Pareto largely ignored the social-historical and insti-
tutional contexts in which elites act, while Weber paid close attention to such 
contexts. When combined, however, the visions of Pareto and Weber dissect 
the vertical aspects of democracies. Pareto attacked the shortcomings and fail-
ures of their elites; Weber worried about the quality of their leaders in the era 
of parliamentary and mass party politics; both outlined elite and leadership 
changes that would or should occur. 
The visions of Pareto and Weber are a springboard from which to examine 
elite and leadership changes that appear to be impelled by extraordinary condi-
tions during the past twenty-five years. Principally and in a nutshell, these 
conditions are the Soviet Union’s collapse and the globalization it spurred; 
recent threats to security posed by terrorism; and the massive numbers of mi-
grants fleeing failed or failing non-Western states. First, the Soviet Union’s 
collapse spurred an almost universal embrace of three principles: the worth of 
private and de-regulated capitalist markets; the superiority of popularly elected 
governments; the necessity for liberty in the form of an unrestricted circulation 
of information. But the wholehearted embrace of these principles has tended to 
disorient elites and leaders in liberal democracies, causing them to adopt unre-
alistic expectations about what can be accomplished in domestic and interna-
tional politics. Second, the spectre of terrorism encourages more assertive and 
zero-sum political competitions, especially in the domain of national security. 
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Widely publicized terrorist threats, accompanied by portrayals of the US-led 
interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan as part of a life-or-death “global war 
against terror,” are used by aggressive elites and forceful leaders to rally popu-
lar support, devastate political competitors, and justify large expansions of 
executive power as necessary to counter external and internal enemies. Third, 
migrations of millions of people from failed or failing Non-western States are 
increasingly viewed as undermining the social and political integration of the 
liberal democracies to which the migrants flee. Technologies for instant 
worldwide communication and rapid transportation – also key aspects of glob-
alisation – facilitate trans-national identities among migrants that make their 
allegiances to host countries uncertain. Migrant communities perceived as 
semi-allegiant or even non-allegiant ignite host population support for rising 
elites and leaders who promise illiberal crackdowns on these communities, the 
sealing of national borders against illegal migrants, and greatly reduced immi-
gration intakes. 
These three conditions exert powerful centripetal pressures on the politics of 
liberal democracies. Our enumeration is hardly exhaustive. The spectres of 
disease pandemics and global warming, the volatility of petroleum and other 
commodity markets, as well as a host of employment insecurities and the eco-
nomic consequences of ageing populations can readily be added. Our claim is 
simply that centripetal pressures stemming primarily from the conditions we 
have mentioned are a root cause of the changing elite and leader patterns in 
which we are interested. They intensify discords in liberal democratic politics, 
promote executive power concentrations, and favour putatively leonine elites 
and forceful leaders. One of Pareto’s dicta is pertinent:  
When centripetal forces are dominant, the central government will be called 
on to provide it. Whenever circumstances turn in favour of this centripetal 
phase, a pre-existing central government, or a central authority new both in 
form and substance, asserts itself sooner or later (1921/1984: 47). 
Elites and Leaders 
It is well known that Pareto and Weber saw rule by elites-cum-oligarchies as 
inescapable in all societies, regardless of the form governance takes. Pareto 
famously claimed that “Everywhere there exists a governing class ... Whether 
universal suffrage prevails or not, always it is an oligarchy that governs” (1935: 
2183). Weber just as famously wrote that “Everywhere the principle of the 
small number – that is, the superior political manoeuvrability of small leading 
groups – determines political activity. In mass states, this caesarist element is 
ineradicable” (1978: 1414). Both believed, nonetheless, that different elite and 
leader modes are associated with different kinds of political regimes. Pareto 
depicted ruling elites in “demagogic plutocracies” – his pejorative term for 
parliamentary democracies – as consisting of a far-flung alliance of fox-like 
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politicians and profit-seeking “speculators” who, through innumerable deals 
and deceptions, prevent an alliance of more leonine politicians and ‘rentiers’ 
from governing. Parliaments, Pareto held, are the arenas in which the dominant 
fox-speculator alliance arranges the chicaneries necessary to keep itself in 
power. Similarly, Weber portrayed the early Weimar democracy and most 
other democracies of his time as essentially “leaderless,” with members of 
elected parliaments engaged in a chaotic horse-trading of sectoral interests. 
Neither man thought that the situation he described could persist indefinite-
ly. Pareto believed that the despoilments by which the fox-speculator alliance 
keeps itself in power ultimately undermine the economy and the state’s fiscal 
viability, opening the door to a take-over by the opposing lion-rentier alliance 
(1921/1984: 71; see also Femia 2001: 80-81). However, the latter’s dominance 
eventually proves so excessively coercive and tight-fisted that it provokes a 
new crisis propitious for the fox-speculator alliance’s return to power. And so 
modern history proceeds, in endless cycles of alternating fox-like and lion-like 
elite rule. Weber was not quite so pessimistic or resigned. He searched for a 
way by which “mass democracy” could be saved from itself. Holding that any 
such democracy is necessarily a “leader democracy” (Körösényi 2005), he 
theorized that rule by professional politicians who “live off” politics, always 
feathering their own nests, might be transcended in “unusual situations” by 
charismatic leaders not beholden to narrow sectoral interests and possessing a 
keen concern for the national good. If directly elected rather than chosen by 
parliaments, such leaders, “living for” rather than off politics, would use their 
charisma and “demagogy” to create powerful mass followings and loyalties 
that would enable them to pursue national interests and goals. The result would 
be a “plebiscitary” or “leadership” democracy, which Weber regarded as mass 
democracy’s only sustainable form (Beetham 1984: 264-267). 
The foregoing is, of course, a pastiche of the complex and subtle analyses 
made by Pareto and Weber. But their analyses are sufficiently familiar to most 
students of elites and leadership to make another exegesis unnecessary (see, 
inter alia, Finer 1965, 1968; Parry 1969/2006; Parkin 1982; Beetham 
1974/1985; Femia 2001). A few elaborations will, however, be useful. First, 
Pareto’s metaphorical distinction between elites as foxes and lions is at odds 
with any typology based on elites’ declared ideological commitments. Pareto 
dismissed ideologies as “derivations” – rationalizations-cum-rhetorical devices 
– and instead anchored his distinction in allegedly deeper and more basic psy-
chological predispositions (“residues”) that shape elites’ modes of rule. Lions, 
manifesting the residues of “group-persistence,” are tough, stubborn, and ag-
gressive; they do not hesitate to use violence to achieve and hold on to power, 
typically framing and merchandizing their actions in terms of mass ethno-
nationalist and religious loyalties. Foxes are cunning, clever, and astute; they 
use wit, manipulation, and diplomacy, rather than force, and frame and mer-
chandize their exercise of power in terms of economic prosperity and their 
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ostensible representation of diverse public interests. Unlike ideological lean-
ings – which elites often alter – these predispositions and proclivities remain 
constant. So do accompanying leadership styles. Foxes never roar; they always 
behave in guileful and stealthy ways. Lions never shed their manes and grow 
bushy tails; force and fear are their preference. 
For Pareto, as we have noted, elite circulation always takes a cyclical form: 
foxes displace lions and new lions then displace the foxes (1935: 222l-2229ff.; 
1921/1984: 47). In the one cycle, centrifugal conditions de-centralize power, 
and this favours opportunistic and cunning elites adept at combining dispersed 
pieces of power in order to ascend and rule. In the other cycle, centripetal pres-
sures force power’s re-centralization, and this favours aggressive and forceful 
elites adept at wielding it more unilaterally. Each cycle inevitably comes to an 
end because each elite type is prone to characteristic dysfunctions that produce 
unsustainable “disequilibria”. Lions fail because they exaggerate the effective-
ness of force, and when they overstretch its use they are out-manoeuvred by 
foxes. But foxes become soft and indecisive (“humanistic”), enabling lions 
waiting in the wings to exploit these weaknesses. The mode of this circulation 
varies in depth and violence between societies and within them over time. In 
general, lions tend to displace foxes and impose themselves through sharp 
power takeovers; foxes take power through gradual penetration and permeation 
of a lion-dominated governmental arena. If lions enter that arena from outside 
it, their seizure of power takes a revolutionary form; if they displace foxes from 
within the arena via factional politics, their takeover is less abrupt. 
This embryonic theory of elite circulation (implied rather than stated in de-
tail by Pareto) resembles a path-dependency account of political change. Pareto 
seems to suggest that each elite cycle is brought about by the preceding cycle’s 
accumulating ills (disequilibria), which flow from the distinctive weaknesses of 
whichever type of elite is then ascendant. The failures of cunning foxes in their 
Machiavellian excesses of deception and stealth open the way to blunt lions 
and their Hobbesian excesses of coercion and force. This cyclical circulation is 
shaped not only by the elites’ qualitative deterioration, but also by sharply 
asymmetric sentiments (residues) between the governing elite and the masses – 
in which case the circulation tends to be revolutionary – or by a less dramatic 
asymmetry of sentiments within the elite stratum itself – in which case circula-
tion is likely to be more peaceful. The elite cycles also tend to coincide with 
economic and cultural oscillations: the predominance of lions and their rentier 
allies accompanies periods of economic decline involving revivals of national-
ism and religiosity; the ascendancy of foxes and speculators accompanies peri-
ods of economic prosperity and secularism. This is more an elite path-
dependency sequence than a circumstances/conditions construct (Timasheff 
1965: 68; Parry 1969/2006: 57-63). 
Pareto’s elite types never appear in pure form and never operate in isolation 
from each other. The predominance of each is always a matter of degree. Be-
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hind every leonine elite in power there is always a foxy one waiting for the 
lions’ dysfunctions and errors to create a political opening, and vice versa. 
Because such dysfunctions and errors are inevitable, neither lions nor foxes are 
inherently superior. When ascendant each degenerates, which is why, in 
Pareto’s view, elite rule seldom stabilizes for any long period of time.1 History 
is not only the graveyard of elites replacing each other, it is also the stage on 
which oscillations and stylistic successions are played out without end. This 
cyclical and cynical (but realistic?) view of history formed a powerful counter-
vision to optimistic liberal-democratic scenarios of progress, and it was, of 
course, a fundamental retort to Marxism. 
Although Weber expounded his concept of leader democracy and his hoped-
for alternative of a more charismatic and plebiscitary leadership democracy in a 
fragmentary way, his analysis helps us to understand the socio-historical and 
institutional contexts in which changes in leaders occur. According to Weber, 
charismatic leadership “always results from unusual, especially political or 
economic, situations” (1978: 1121). These are situations of crisis or of sudden 
and unexpected developments that trigger collective excitements, anxieties, and 
expectations culminating in “surrender to heroism” (1978: 1132). The situa-
tions or developments are transitional and are followed by more stable forms of 
authority, but so long as they last the transitions are tension-filled. Charismatic 
and plebiscitary leadership emerges as “the most important transitional type” of 
authority (1978: 267) – a sort of halfway house between charismatic domina-
tion and the legal-rational form stable political institutions must ultimately take 
in modern societies. Under condition of mass democratization – in particular, 
the direct election of political leaders by masses of voters – charismatic and 
plebiscitary leadership may emerge and rest on popular acclamation (elections) 
and public trust. Leaders will act “on behalf of the people” and legitimate their 
decisions in terms of the “will of the people”. This will of the people is evoked 
and cultivated through leaders’ direct appeals and their use of demagogy (1978: 
241-271, 1111-1155). 
Charismatic and plebiscitary leadership, Weber observes, extends to a lead-
er’s administrative staff – what might also be thought of as the elite surround-
ing the leader. Staff members worship the leader (the charismatic principle) and 
bask in the confidence the masses have in him or her (the plebiscitary prin-
ciple). This staff elite – typically the leader’s trusted confidants – cannot easily 
                                                             
1  Pareto and his intellectual comrades, Mosca and Michels, stressed the overriding and very 
personal interests of elites in obtaining power’s immediate psychological rewards and so-
cial protections. In pursuing power, elites of a similar type support each other, and this mu-
tual support – reflecting calculated power interests more than ideological affinities – en-
hances their success. Put differently, the preponderant interest of elites is in wielding 
power, not in promoting the interests of a collectivity such as a class or an ethnie, or realiz-
ing an ideological program. Elites that disregard or downplay the vicissitudes of power and 
its exercise fall victim to more ruthless or cunning competitors. 
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be integrated into a hierarchical authority structure because the foundations of 
its power rest outside the institutional realm. Therefore, instead of an integrated 
hierarchy charismatic and plebiscitary leadership tends to produce centralized 
and autocephalous spheres of authority and diluted staff elite competencies. In 
this situation, top figures in the elite exercising executive power cannot be 
controlled by parties or parliaments and cannot be dismissed without the lead-
er’s approval. Their political fate is determined by the leader’s trust in them 
and the confidence of the people, rather than by their administrative compe-
tence. 
In Weber’s view, by paving the way for persons skilled in demagogy, rather 
than just gifted orators like lawyers, the plebiscitary principle favours “the type 
of individual who is most spectacular, who promises the most, or who employs 
the most effective propaganda measures in the competition for leadership” 
(1978: 1451). Under plebiscitary leadership, then, politics display the emotion-
al and irrational features typical of charismatically-led orders, and they militate 
against deliberative policy-making and long-term rationalization. However, 
charismatic and plebiscitary leadership does not preclude further transition to a 
more rationalized, orderly, and workable leader democracy. Whether this fur-
ther transition occurs, as well as its speed, depend on adopting a functional 
division of powers and forming a strong party machine that takes over as the 
locus of political allegiance and mobilization of public (electoral) support. 
In a well-functioning leader democracy, according to Weber, and as Andras 
Körösényi (2005) ably elucidates, a charismatic and plebiscitary leader can be 
insulated from immediate public pressures and subjected to some collegial 
control. The leader and the staff elite surrounding him or her still impose them-
selves on the people, but their political success depends on winning competi-
tive elections – on proving themselves effective in generating mass support. 
This support is at once diffuse and personalized. Political rivals use rhetoric 
and image manipulation to engineer personal support, inspire personal loyalty, 
sway public opinion, and generate trust, especially at the crucial moments of 
electoral contests. Public support is, in other words, the product of the political 
process, not of some bottom-up aggregation of pre-existing interests and views 
(Körösényi 2005: 365). If successful in using rhetoric and image to generate 
support, a charismatic and statesman-like leader secures public trust, loyalty, 
and respect. The mass demand for leadership is satisfied, the confidence of the 
masses is won, and, most important, an aura of responsibility is created and 
sustained. This, in turn, enables leaders to work with parliamentary colleagues 
and pursue “continuous and consistent policies” (Weber 1978: 1459). 
Pareto and Weber were close observers of politics in their respective coun-
tries, Italy and Germany, and of European developments more widely, during 
the twentieth century’s early years. Agonizing over Italy’s post-World War I 
political turmoil, which culminated in the “March on Rome” by Mussolini and 
his Blackshirts in 1922, Pareto identified the ascending fascists with lions. 
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Initially, he pinned on them his hopes for Italy’s renewal, although he recog-
nized that the fascists were ultra-nationalists coming from outside the govern-
mental arena and therefore likely to take power in a revolutionary and violent 
manner; they were profiting ruthlessly from conditions of social, economic and 
political crisis, and their repressions of opponents were ugly to behold. In rela-
tively short order (albeit after Pareto’s death in 1923), Mussolini and his elite 
assumed dictatorial power, displaying much aggressiveness, corruption, and 
brutality, the early signs of which Pareto condemned in a political testament 
written from his deathbed. Weber, observing only briefly before his death in 
mid-1920 the already devastating consequences of the Treaty of Versailles for 
Germany, believed that his country’s authoritarian heritage, political extrem-
ism, now leaderless bureaucracy, and dispirited masses pointed toward “a polar 
night of icy darkness and hardness” unless a charismatic and appropriately 
demagogic leader emerged and headed off this fate (quoted by Antonio 1995: 
2370-2371). As things turned out, of course, it was Hitler who emerged as 
Führer, mimicking Mussolini’s title of Duce. The ascendancies of the two 
leaders and elites induced a proto-leonine shift in ruling styles throughout 
Europe and parts of the western hemisphere, with even an echo in far-off Aus-
tralia in the form of an incipient fascist movement, the New Guard (Linz 1978; 
Paxton 2004; Macintyre 2004: 182). 
We encapsulate this familiar history in order to observe that the belligerence 
and brutality of the fascists/Nazis discredited, so to speak, the image of leonine 
elites and charismatic leaders. Following their rules by terror, wartime atroci-
ties, and the racism and ultra-nationalism they spouted, the leonine fasc-
ists/Nazis were regarded with contempt and hatred. Their grievous over-
reaching and consequent defeat in World War II were the start of a shift in elite 
and leader types ascendant in post-war liberal democracies. 
Elites and Leaders after World War II 
Pareto and Weber lived in countries and at a time when elite conflicts and 
rivalries between leaders were – and had always been – largely unchecked. 
Following national unification in Italy and Germany, deep ideological chasms 
and mutual distrusts separated opposing elite camps. They disagreed funda-
mentally about the political institutions on which their new national states 
rested and they strove to defend or destroy governments of the day according to 
their conflicting stances and bases of support. The elites that Pareto and Weber 
knew best were, in a word, deeply disunited. In Italy, to be sure, right-wing 
monarchical and left-wing republican elite camps fused in the famous trasform-
ismo of 1876, but this proved too narrow to accommodate spreading popular 
mobilizations of peasants and workers suffering the harshness of industrializa-
tion and led by emerging Catholic and socialist elites who had no place in the 
fused elite and thus no stake in the regime (Cotta 1992). Exacerbated by for-
 342 
eign misadventures, such as the Libyan War in 1912, the elite power struggles 
became steadily more explosive during the years before and after World War I, 
and they led to fascist dictatorship after the assassination of Socialist leader 
Giacomo Matteotti in June 1924 and the withdrawal of Socialist deputies from 
Parliament. In the German Reich authoritarian rule by Bismarck and his suc-
cessors and by elites associated with them kept the lid on a boiling political pot. 
But the Imperial regime was reviled by elites leading bourgeois and working-
class organizations and movements, and the lid finally came off in the “leader-
less” Weimar Republic, the inception of which Weber witnessed. 
The disunited condition of Italian and German elites was mirrored in nearly 
all other European countries (and in all countries of Latin America) before and 
after World War I. The exceptions were Britain, The Netherlands, Sweden, and 
Switzerland where, in much earlier and highly contingent circumstances, basic 
“consensual” unifications of previously disunited elites had occurred – Eng-
land’s “Glorious Revolution” in 1688-1689; elites in the Dutch Provinces band-
ing together to free themselves from Spanish colonial rule in the late sixteenth 
century; Sweden’s constitutional revolution in 1809; the unification effected by 
elites in the aftermath of Switzerland’s short civil war during 1847-1848. Polit-
ically, those four countries, with stable liberal oligarchies governing them, 
constituted marked deviations in a European landscape suffused by unbridged 
elite divisions and unstable, mainly authoritarian, regimes (Higley and Burton 
2006: 33-54). Pareto and Weber thus drew their lessons primarily from a par-
ticular pattern of elite relations – disunited – and from the capricious leaders 
and regimes to which it gives rise. 
It is interesting to speculate about how their analyses might have been tem-
pered if Pareto and Weber had had greater knowledge of the consensually 
united elite pattern. In its extensive communication and influence networks 
integrate competing factions and leaders who share an underlying consensus 
about most norms of political conduct and the worth of most existing political 
institutions. Elite factions and leaders accord each other significant trust, coo-
perate tacitly to contain explosive conflicts, and compete for political power in 
comparatively restrained ways. Power sharing is the hallmark of a consensually 
united elite, and the periodic, peaceful alternations in executive power that 
mark liberal democracies are its principal manifestation (Higley and Burton 
2006: 8-15). Pareto’s grudging admiration for the politics practiced by Swiss 
elites and Weber’s praise for William Gladstone’s leadership role in British 
politics suggested an awareness that elites are not always and everywhere as 
blinkered as Pareto found them in Italy, and that “leader democracies” are not 
always as bereft of capable leaders as Weber observed of Germany. 
In ways and for reasons too varied to recount here, between about 1950 and 
1980 consensually united elites and the liberal democracies they made possible 
formed in all West European countries where elites had long been disunited 
(for accounts, see Higley and Burton 2006). Political practices by fox-like 
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elites and relatively prosaic leaders came to prevail. Tripartite deals were cut 
by government, business, and trade union elites to create neo-corporatist con-
dominiums (Schmitter 1974), and state power was used as a regulatory-welfare 
tool to expand social rights, a practice that was endorsed, more tacitly than 
explicitly, by all main elite camps. Elites and leaders of nearly all stripes pro-
fessed to believe that with minor exceptions the activities of each social group-
ing contributed to the well being of all groupings. Accordingly, each had an 
interest in securing the cooperation of others in the common operation of social 
and political institutions. This sense of social interests meshing in some broad 
common interest and leaving special interests so limited as to be easily negoti-
able was widespread among elites and leaders, so much so that it became fa-
shionable to talk about ideology having “ended”. A period of Tweedledum and 
Tweedledee political contests undergirded by economic expansion unfolded – 
the “halcyon years” that lasted until the oil shocks and stagflation of the late 
1970s (Field and Higley 1986). Had he witnessed this, Pareto would have 
thought his analysis of demagogic plutocracy born out, but Weber might have 
had second thoughts about the sustainability of democracies with leaders lack-
ing charisma when observing West Germany under Adenauer, Erhard and their 
chancellor successors; Italy in the time of Fanfani, Moro, and the raft of mani-
pulators who followed them; Norway and Sweden under somnolent father 
figures like Gerhardsen and Erlander; a UK led by the uninspiring but devious 
Macmillan and Wilson; the US during the grey Eisenhower and crafty Johnson 
and Nixon presidencies; the game of musical chairs being played in Japan by 
interchangeable LDP leaders – the list could be much longer. On the other 
hand, Weber might have found his analysis of leader democracy strikingly 
illustrated by the charismatic Charles de Gaulle’s rescue of France from its 
leaderless Fourth Republic. 
Building consensus through deals among major sectors, quieting the less 
well-off with welfare subsidies, paying off other disgruntled groups, and man-
aging public opinion through increasingly powerful mass media triumphed to 
such an extent during the twentieth century’s third quarter that these practices 
came to be seen as the natural, or at least normal, form of politics in liberal 
democracies. In those years hardly anyone wondered if the combination of 
modern organization and advancing technology might be creating a social order 
in which it would be difficult to keep a reasonable proportion of the population 
engaged in activities that others could accept as contributing to the common 
benefit (but cf. Field and Higley 1980). Starting in the late 1970s, however, the 
practices of fox-like elites and sly if largely grey leaders were gradually un-
dermined by problems or “disequilibria” as Pareto would say: the inability of 
welfare policies to stanch the growth of an impoverished and socially disorga-
nized underclass; structural unemployment impervious to economic growth; 
high rates of inflation induced by the deficit-financed Vietnam War and OPEC 
oil shocks; declining state fiscal and regulatory capacities; a proliferation of 
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single-issue parties and volatile voters contributing to the collapse of some of 
the elite coalitions cemented in neo-corporatist pacts. 
These problems-cum-disequilibria were highly publicized in the media and 
in critical analyses questioning the effectiveness, even the legitimacy, of ascen-
dant leaders and elites – in particular, Jimmy Carter and his administration, the 
premiership of “Sunny Jim” Callaghan in the UK, Helmut Schmidt’s chancel-
lorship in West Germany. A backlash gathered force and champions of tougher 
practices captured public support. Economic rationalist and neo-laissez-faire 
principles that leave people to sink or swim on their own became fashionable 
guides to policy, and previously marginal elite factions and leaders espousing 
those principles came to the fore. Thatcher, Reagan, and Kohl signified the first 
wave of more tough-minded governance. Thatcher launched a bold military 
expedition against Argentina in the Falkland Islands and faced down the pre-
viously invincible mineworkers’ union. The elite around Reagan did the same 
to a union of air traffic controllers, undertook a massive military build-up, 
armed and bankrolled mujhaddin insurgents against the Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan and anti-Sandinist “freedom fighters” in Nicaragua, and voiced 
unremitting hostility toward the Soviet Union’s “evil empire”. Kohl acted 
decisively to reunify Germany, he led the EU’s Maastricht Treaty effort, his 
government precipitously legitimated Yugoslavia’s break-up, and it unshackled 
German military forces for previously forbidden foreign deployments. 
Because the collapse of Soviet communism between 1989 and 1991 could 
plausibly be portrayed, whatever the reality, as a Reagan-Thatcher-Kohl victo-
ry, it enhanced the shift toward more forceful elites and leaders. In the US 
demands for tough market rationalism and “getting government off people’s 
backs” became drumbeats that in 1994 delivered control of Congress to Repub-
licans under the self-proclaimed “revolutionary” leadership of Newt Gingrich. 
The alleged folly of decreased US military spending in the wake of the Soviet 
collapse became the rallying cry of an aggressive neo-conservative elite that 
was now fully formed (e.g., Kristol and Kagan 2000). This elite’s no-holds-
barred tactics were soon evident in the Clinton impeachment proceedings. 
When the elite, astride George W. Bush, failed to win the 2000 presidential 
election outright, it ruthlessly exploited an electoral standoff in Florida to ob-
tain the White House keys from a friendly Supreme Court majority. Donald 
Rumsfeld and other top members of the elite immediately began talking, albeit 
in secret, about the need to eliminate the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq 
(Suskind, 2004:80-82); the Vice President, Dick Cheney, quietly concentrated 
executive power in his office beyond any US historical precedent; and a sym-
biosis of the elite’s congressional leaders and Washington “K Street” business 
lobbyists began a thorough de-regulation of the energy, communications, fi-
nancial, and other main economic sectors. In the course of 2001, especially 
after 9/11, it dawned on observers of American politics that an uncompromis-
ing elite had taken over. Coinciding with this US change, Junichiro Koizumi 
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was installed as Japan’s prime minister that April; in May Silvio Berlusconi 
swept into power in Rome; Tony Blair won a second term, nearly by acclama-
tion, a month later; and in November John Howard played the fear cards of 
asylum-seeking migrant hordes and terrorism to win a third and crushing elec-
tion victory in Australia. 
Current Elites and Leaders Assessed 
Elite alignments and alliances during these early years of the new century are 
much more complex than during the twentieth century’s “halcyon” period. 
They involve international elite cartels – economic, political, military, and 
intelligence – whose national components support each other’s positions and 
policies. Elite positioning in these cartels is as important as positioning in the 
various national power games. Leaders of the cartels’ national components 
consult frequently with each other, borrow freely from each other’s policy 
repertoires, and shore each other up in crises and election campaigns. Non-stop 
electronic media promote political competitions that are much more stylistic 
than substantive. Appeals for support focus on personalities and leadership 
images rather than policy platforms, and they aim at gaining short-term public 
approval instead of long-term support. But because these changes have oc-
curred gradually, taking place largely within the elite stratum, they are difficult 
to assess. 
More leonine elites and forceful leaders are, nonetheless, evident in some of 
the most important liberal democracies. Exhibit A is the assertion of America’s 
geo-political hegemony by the Bush elite. With its inner core of force-oriented 
“Vulcans,” its Spartan élan, executive power concentration, and peremptory 
actions, the elite has clear leonine features (Mann 2004; Higley 2006). Efforts 
by ruling elites and leaders in Japan and several European countries to ameli-
orate economic stagnation and unemployment are also more aggressive and 
forceful. In Japan, for example, Koizumi and his associates ended fifteen years 
of deflation, stoked nationalism and military strength, and broke the hold that 
the “iron triangle” of bureaucrats, businessmen, and LDP placemen long had 
on economic policy. Merkel in Germany and de Villepin and his shadow, Sar-
kozy, in France have sought to act in tough ways to dispel high unemployment, 
especially among young people. Nearly everywhere in the face of post-9/11 
security fears, governing elites deploy expanded intelligence-security appara-
tuses to put mass publics, notably immigrant Muslim communities, under close 
surveillance. Consider, for example, the Bush administration’s secret and war-
rantless monitoring of phone calls and e-mails among what is guessed to be 45 
million US residents, as well as its secret inspection of international transfers of 
bank funds by many residents. Or consider the Blair government’s elaborate 
monitoring and tracking of two scores of UK residents allegedly intent on 
blowing up airplanes bound for the US in August 2006. Add to these examples 
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the complicity of European governments in the CIA’s secret transport of ab-
ducted terrorist suspects through airports and air spaces in order to imprison or 
“rendition” them. 
A leonine ascendancy is apparent in other respects. Acting forcefully against 
long Labour Party proclivities, Tony Blair and his entourage have given the 
UK core executive expanded resources and a streamlined capacity to impose 
policies (Burch and Holliday 2004-2005), traded peerages and honours for 
campaign contributions, and provided business firms with lucrative opportuni-
ties to invest in the public sector. Like members of the Bush elite, most of those 
in the core executive elite around Blair have not served party and parliamentary 
apprenticeships but have instead parachuted into power positions from think 
tanks, public relations firms, business, and other locations. Blair and his lieu-
tenants took the grave step of participating in the invasion of Iraq despite two 
cabinet resignations and vociferous opposition in parliament, the Labour Party, 
and the British public. In Australia John Howard and a surrounding staff elite 
similar in its extra-parliamentary origins to Blair’s joined the “coalition of the 
willing” in Iraq despite intense parliamentary and public opposition. The How-
ard elite has twice launched risky military peacekeeping missions in East 
Timor, intervened with force in the Solomon Islands, threatened pre-emptive 
attacks on terrorist redoubts in Southeast Asia, and won three re-elections 
through bare-knuckled campaigns that whipped up voters’ fears. In Italy for 
four years Silvio Berlusconi and the elite around him played fast and loose with 
parliamentary and judicial practices, exerted near monopoly control of televi-
sion, and followed the Bush, Blair, and Howard elites into Iraq in the teeth of 
public opposition. In Denmark, where public anxieties about immigration have 
tended to override foreign affairs, Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s government has 
cut the number of asylum seekers by half, paid Afghan asylum seekers to return 
home, and restricted the entry of Muslim clerics, without as yet stanching 
growth of the anti-immigrant People’s Party and its demands for even more 
stringent measures. As illustrated by Donald Rumsfeld’s six-year tenure at the 
Pentagon, top elite figures responsible for policy disasters cannot be controlled 
by parliaments or parties and can be ousted only by the paramount political 
leader. 
Yet it must be asked if this onset of more leonine elites and forceful leaders 
is really just a blip on the radar screens of liberal democracies. Do we not mis-
take fairly normal alternations in power, perhaps made sharper by the magni-
tudes of today’s centripetal pressures, for a basic and lasting change in elite and 
leader modes? There are many indications, after all, that the Bush elite has in 
its hubris and miscalculations disastrously overextended US military power and 
destroyed the US claim to geo-political hegemony. Signs are numerous that the 
US political elite as a whole is deeply disillusioned by the course of events in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, by the Bush administration’s gross incompetence when 
responding to Hurricane Katrina’s devastation in 2005, and by craven and often 
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corrupt deals between Bush elite allies and sundry clienteles. If Democrats 
regain control of Congress in the November 2006 mid-term elections the elite’s 
political paralysis will probably follow, and in any event Bush, Cheney and 
their top associates will exit power at the end of 2008. Extensive military re-
pairs and yawning fiscal deficits will be crippling bills that their successors will 
then have to pay. The departure of Tony Blair and his entourage from power in 
London will precede the Bush elite’s exit. Silvio Berlusconi is, for the moment 
at least, gone from power in Rome; Junichiro Koizumi vacates Japan’s prime 
ministership in September 2006; Australia’s 2007 federal election is certain to 
be John Howard’s last. Although Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s reelection in 
Denmark in 2005 was the first ever achieved by a Danish Liberal leader, his 
party, as well as the opposition Social Democrats, lost votes and seats to anti-
immigrant and conservative competitors so that Rasmussen’s political domin-
ance is in doubt. And it remains to be seen if Stephen Harper and Angela Mer-
kel and their executive elites can act forcefully in the absence of firm parlia-
mentary control. As regards the jockeying of elites and leaders for presidential 
power in France, ‘uncertain’ and ‘volatile’ are unavoidable adjectives. In short, 
the patterns we have been exploring are ambiguous; they may be more ephe-
meral and putative than central and lasting. Nevertheless, they warrant a few 
concluding reflections. 
Conclusions 
For a start, today’s seemingly more leonine elites and forceful leaders are quite 
timid when compared with forebears in interwar Europe. The shift that we have 
been exploring bears little substantive resemblance to the revolutionary 
changes that then took place. This difference is at least partly anticipated by 
Pareto’s thesis that deep and violent elite circulations occur only as the result of 
wars or other truly explosive crises. Although it is conceivable that the Iraq and 
Afghanistan military quagmires may produce a major crisis in the U.S., the 
shift in elites and leaders there and everywhere else has to date occurred more 
or less gradually within each country’s elite stratum and in conformance, by 
and large, with established institutions. There has been no clear rupturing of 
liberal democracy. But although timid by historical measure, the current elites 
and leaders we have discussed dress actions in nationalist and populist garbs 
and present themselves as champions of the morally upright ‘heartland’. They 
portray terrorist threats to established ways of life as being so dire that harsh 
and peremptory actions, many of which cannot ‘safely’ be made public, are 
imperative. In a plebiscitary way they enlist mass support by daily and care-
fully orchestrated appearances in the mass media where they portray opponents 
as cowardly and unpatriotic. 
Second, and as we said at the outset, the shift in elites and leaders is not uni-
form across the liberal democracies. Signs of it are fainter and more uneven in 
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Europe than in the US, Australia, and, arguably, Japan, where Shinzo Abe, a 
hard-line nationalist who is an enthusiastic pilgrim to the Yasukuni Shrine, has 
succeeded Koizumi as prime minister. But we should keep in mind that 
changes in interwar Europe were not uniform either, and they stretched over 
two decades. Mussolini and his fascists took power in 1922-1924, Stalin did so 
in 1928-1929, Hitler and the Nazis took over in 1933, the same year that Sala-
zar instituted Portugal’s Estado Novo-, Dolfuss took control in Vienna a year 
later; Metaxas did so in Athens in 1936; Franco consolidated his regime only 
after the civil war in Spain. Meanwhile, France, the Low Countries, Scandina-
via, and the Anglo- American democracies experienced no such basic interwar 
elite and leader change, although several, like Belgium, came perilously close 
to it. The current shift is, in other words, no more patchy – although it is cer-
tainly less clear-cut – than the interwar one. 
Third, the extent to which the shift is a by-product of US developments nags 
our exploration. Because of US influence – hegemony if one prefers – the Bush 
elite’s aggressive actions promote comparable actions elsewhere. Thus gov-
ernments led by Blair, Berlusconi, Howard, Rasmussen, and by José Maria 
Aznar in Spain joined the Bush elite’s military interventions in Afghanistan 
and then Iraq, as did governing elites and leaders in most countries of Eastern 
Europe. They did this for reasons having as much to do with maintaining their 
alliances and trading relations with the all-important US as with assessments 
that their own security interests dictated the costly interventions. Likewise, 
clampdowns on migrant communities that might be harbouring terrorist cells 
appear to be instigated, at least in part, by the demands of US intelligence 
agencies. It can be asked, in short, whether the shift we detect is mostly a re-
verberation of what has been occurring in the US. 
Another question, related to the one just posed, is whether the US develop-
ments – the Bush elite’s ascendancy and actions – are themselves an aberration 
or fluke that is now greatly diminished. Despite a mountainous literature ex-
amining the Bush elite, there is no agreed understanding of it. In particular, the 
decision to attack Iraq continues to baffle those who have studied it from out-
side the elite’s inner sanctum. The 9/11 terrorist attacks, which have been the 
main public rationale for the Iraq venture, did not change the international 
situation of the US one iota. Like the air raid on Tokyo led by Jimmy Doolittle 
in early 1942, the 9/11 takeovers of passenger planes for use as guided missiles 
were almost certainly non-repeatable, and, dramatic though they were, they 
exacted a cost in lives far fewer than the 17,000 homicides and 40,000 car 
accident fatalities each year in the US. While retaliating against al Queda and 
its Taliban hosts in Afghanistan was clearly warranted and politically essential, 
the decision to invade Iraq was either a blunder born of hubris and historic 
miscalculation about the ability of the US to implant “freedom and democracy” 
where it has never existed, or it was part of a much larger, though equally du-
bious, secret strategy to establish in Iraq a military platform from which the 
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Middle East could be made safe for petroleum supplies and Israel. The conse-
quence, in any event, has been evisceration of the Bush elite’s political credi-
bility, even its legitimacy, so that it no longer serves as a beacon for elites and 
leaders in other liberal democracies. In this respect, a US stoking of the shift to 
more leonine elites and forceful leaders be ending. 
Strong centripetal pressures on liberal democracies remain, however, and 
they are likely to increase. Elites and leaders sense that these pressures require 
bolder and more forceful responses. With leaders who may be more ersatz than 
genuinely charismatic, liberal democracies will have still greater plebiscitary 
features. Appeals for support utilizing emotional and irrational rhetoric and the 
careful management of leader images are here to stay. Behind their trappings 
are likely to be more leonine elites that benefit politically from alliances with 
large and propertied plutocratic strata. What remains to be seen is how strong 
and vigorous these elites will be, how much they will value loyalty over exper-
tise and intellectual advice, how sharply they will centralize executive power in 
a few hands, and, therefore, how prone they will be to errors, overstretching, 
and a new penetration by foxes. 
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